

BACK TO BASICS:

Reviving Nuclear Disarmament in the Non-Proliferation Regime

by David Krieger and Carah Ong

Nuclear Age
Peace Foundation
Briefing for the
2005 Review
Conference of the
Non-Proliferation
Treaty



THE FOUNDATION

The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation is a non-profit, non-partisan international organization on the Roster in consultative status to the United Nations Economic and Social Council. Founded in 1982, the Foundation is a catalyst in enhancing global security by initiating and supporting efforts to reduce nuclear dangers; strengthening international law and institutions; and working to inspire and empower a new generation of peace leaders.

VISION

Our vision is a world at peace,
free of the threat of war and
free of weapons of mass destruction.

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To advance initiatives to eliminate
the nuclear weapons threat to all life,
to foster the global rule of law, and
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through education and advocacy.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was built on a basic bargain: the non-nuclear weapons states agreed to forego developing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons in exchange for a commitment on the part of the nuclear weapons states to end the nuclear arms race at an early date and to engage in "good faith" negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament. For the treaty to succeed in its purpose, both sides of the bargain must be fulfilled. With a few notable exceptions, the non-nuclear weapons states have kept their end of the bargain. On the other hand, the nuclear weapons states have shown scant inclination to fulfill their disarmament commitments. Both sides of the bargain are equally important and mutually reinforcing. Preventing nuclear proliferation cannot be guaranteed without nuclear disarmament, and nuclear disarmament cannot succeed without preventing nuclear proliferation.

In order to counter the perceived power of nuclear weapons states, acquiring nuclear weapons has become the goal of some countries and extremist groups. The rapid spread of and increased ability to access information, along with scientific expertise and technical capacity, has also made it easier than ever before to build a nuclear weapon. Furthermore, it has also become easier to obtain fissile material from hundreds of poorly guarded nuclear sites throughout the world. With all of these developments, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the non-proliferation and disarmament regimes in general are under severe threat of unraveling altogether.

The five nuclear weapons states recognized under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States) have long tried to maintain exclusivity in their possession of nuclear weapons, which over time has only enhanced the perception that nuclear weapons are a source of power and prestige. In addition, their continued possession of nuclear weapons demon-

strates to the world that even the most economically and militarily powerful nations rely upon nuclear weapons for security. Furthermore, the possession of nuclear weapons provides the nuclear weapons states with a psychological advantage through the tacit threat to use these weapons in a worst case conflict scenario. All of these factors provide incentives for proliferation.

At the 2000 NPT Review Conference the parties to the treaty adopted by consensus a Final Document that contained 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament.

These steps included the ratification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty; the preservation and strengthening of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; and called for the nuclear weapons states to take unilateral as well as multilateral steps to achieve nuclear disarmament. The steps also called for greater transparency with regard to nuclear arsenals and for making irreversibility a principle of nuclear weapons reductions. On virtually every one of these steps, the nuclear weapons states have not fulfilled their commitments.

The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation calls for the following eight interlinking commitments to be made by the nuclear weapons states at the 2005 NPT Review Conference and measured by tangible progress in a timely manner. Some of these commitments have been made in the past and these must be reaffirmed. The

nuclear weapons states must agree clearly and unambiguously to all eight commitments. The nuclear weapons states must realize that they can no longer view nuclear weapons as a source of power and prestige in today's world when they pose such incredible danger to the very people they portend to protect. While to some countries, moving toward eliminating nuclear arsenals may appear to be a sacrifice, it is undoubtedly a sacrifice that will have tangible security benefits for themselves and for the world.

“In my view, we have come to a fork in the road: either there must be a demonstrated commitment to move toward nuclear disarmament, or we should resign ourselves to the fact that other countries will pursue a more dangerous parity through proliferation. The difficulty of achieving our ultimate objective — the elimination of all nuclear weapons — should by no means be underestimated. But at the same time, it should not be used as a pretext for failing to start the process of drastic reductions in existing nuclear arsenals, and simultaneously to explore the development of collective response mechanisms that will be needed against any future clandestine nuclear proliferation efforts.”

— Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei
Director General, International
Atomic Energy Agency

The Eight Commitments

1. Total nuclear disarmament and good faith negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament.
 2. A timeframe for achieving significant markers on the road to complete nuclear disarmament in order to provide assurance of the political will by the nuclear weapons states to fulfilling their obligations in a timely way.
 3. Policies of No First Use of nuclear weapons against other nuclear weapons states and policies of No Use against non-nuclear weapons states.
 4. The verifiability of all steps in the process of eliminating nuclear weapons, including reductions in nuclear armaments and stores of fissile materials.
 5. Stand down nuclear forces by taking nuclear weapons off high-alert status and increasing the time needed to fire a nuclear weapon from minutes to at least hours, and preferably days.
 6. No development of any new nuclear weapons and a halt to improvement upon existing weapons.
 7. A global, verifiable ban on the production of fissile materials and to disposing of fissile materials from dismantled nuclear weapons under international safeguards.
 8. Accounting and transparency with regard to nuclear arsenals and regular reporting on progress made in fulfilling commitments to achieve the elimination of nuclear arsenals.
1. Negotiate a global ban on spent fuel reprocessing and reduce reliance on nuclear power in favor of energy from renewable sources.
 2. Bring uranium enrichment and plutonium separation facilities under strict international control and begin universal on-site inspection of nuclear power facilities.
 3. Regulate and store spent nuclear fuel from reactors under strict international control.
 4. Make the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol mandatory for all states, including the nuclear weapons states.
 5. Highly restrict the trade of all nuclear materials and technology and place them under strict international control.

Conclusions

The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is at a fork in the road. Nuclear proliferation can be prevented, but only if the nuclear weapons states also uphold their end of the bargain. Negotiated and verifiable solutions to the proliferation issues the world faces today can be achieved, but not without the nuclear weapons states demonstrating the political will to meet their own nuclear disarmament obligations.

The nuclear weapons states must promptly and transparently begin the “unequivocal undertaking” to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals by making the eight commitments listed above and leading the way in closing the Article IV “loophole.” If this is not achieved, other countries and extremist groups will continue attempts to counter the perceived power of the nuclear weapons states by acquiring their own nuclear weapons capabilities. This would be a tragedy of enormous proportions and must be averted by urgent and determined action now.

Closing the Article IV “Loophole”

In addition to the above commitments, the Article IV “loophole” in the NPT must also be addressed. The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation calls upon all states currently capable of producing highly enriched uranium and plutonium to immediately:

THE BASIC BARGAIN: NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is now 35 years old, having entered into force in 1970. Despite being one of the world's most widely adhered to treaties – with 188 countries currently parties to the treaty – the NPT is at a crossroads and must be strengthened in order to meet the nuclear proliferation challenges of today's world. On the occasion of the seventh NPT Review Conference, in this 60th year of the Nuclear Age, it is appropriate to take stock of the treaty's strengths and weaknesses, and to offer proposals for making the treaty and nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regimes more effective.

The NPT was built on a basic bargain: the non-nuclear weapons states agreed to forego developing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons in exchange for a commitment on the part of the nuclear weapons states to end the nuclear arms race at an early date and to engage in “good faith” negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament. For the treaty to succeed in its purpose, both sides of the bargain must be fulfilled. The foreign ministers of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden) stated this very clearly in a 2004 joint statement: “Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are two sides of the same coin, and both must be energetically pursued.”¹

The major challenge to the non-proliferation regime is that both parts of the bargain have not been pursued with equal commitment. Even in its inception, the NPT established a system of inequality, defining the nuclear “haves” and “have-nots,” and this inequality continues to hamper progress in preventing nuclear proliferation. Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has repeatedly returned to this point: “We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some

countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and postulate plans for their use.”²

The dilemma is not only a question of patience on the part of the non-nuclear weapons states, although they have exhibited extraordinary patience with the nuclear weapons states. It is also a question of considerable danger. So long as the nuclear weapons states continue to rely upon nuclear weapons in the belief that it bolsters their security, they run the risk that their behavior will provoke other countries to do the same. The continued reliance on nuclear weapons thus promotes nuclear proliferation. In turn, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, technology and materials increases the likelihood of these weapons finding their way into the hands of extremist

groups that would not hesitate to use them. A sobering consideration of the situation suggests that the nuclear weapons states are placing their citizens, as well as others, in grave danger by their continued reliance on these weapons of mass terror and murder.

Historical Perspective

Ten years ago, in 1995, the NPT was extended indefinitely. At that time, the nuclear weapons states gave assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear weapons states and also reiterated their pledge to pursue good faith efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament as required by Article VI of the treaty. Just a year later, the International Court of Justice issued its opinion on the illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, in which the Court interpreted the nuclear disarmament requirement of the NPT in this way: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament

“The world cannot afford to be complacent about the existence and threat of nuclear weapons. First and foremost we need to keep before us the essential bargain that the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty represents. While we will willingly contribute to non-proliferation and counter-proliferation initiatives, those initiatives should be promoted alongside initiatives to secure binding commitments from those who have nuclear weapons which move us further towards the longer-term goal of nuclear disarmament.”

—Hon. Helen Clark
Prime Minister of New Zealand

¹ Statement by the New Agenda Coalition on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, *International Herald Tribune*, 21 September 2004.

² “Saving Ourselves from Self-Destruction,” *New York Times*, 12 February 2004

in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”³ In his Declaration, the President of the Court, Mohammed Bedjaoui, referred to nuclear weapons as “the ultimate evil.”⁴

In the conclusion of his Declaration, President Bedjaoui stated, “The solution arrived at in this Advisory Opinion frankly states the legal reality, while faithfully expressing and reflecting the hope, shared by all, peoples and States alike, that nuclear disarmament will always remain the ultimate goal of all actions in the field of nuclear weapons, that the goal is no longer utopian and that it is the duty of all to seek to attain it more actively than ever.”⁵

Five years ago, at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the parties agreed in the Final Document to 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament.⁶ These agreed-upon 13 steps gave hope that concrete actions would be taken to move forward the nuclear disarmament agenda. Most discouraging to the non-nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT must be the nearly complete lack of progress on these important steps, most of all on the pledge contained in step six for “[a]n unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.”⁷

Most lacking in the policies of the nuclear weapons states is the political will to fulfill their nuclear disarmament obligations. These states continue to focus on policies to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons to other states, but demonstrate scant interest in fulfilling their own obligations. While one arms control agreement, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), was signed between the US and Russia in 2002, it is a treaty that fails to provide for verification and has no requirements that disarmament be irreversible, as called for in the 13 Practical Steps. The SORT treaty will reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons in the arsenals of both the US and Russia to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the year 2012, but has no timetable, no requirement for verification, and no requirement for dismantlement and destruction of the warheads taken off

strategic deployment status. After 2012, the treaty requirements are ended and, without extension, the parties will be free to redeploy the warheads shelved under the agreement.

After praising the SORT Treaty, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan pointed out that “the unique responsibilities of nuclear-weapon States also entails unique responsibility, and they must do more, including but not limited to further reductions in their arsenals of non-strategic nuclear weapons and pursuing arms control agreements that entail not just dismantlement but irreversibility.”⁸ He also called upon the nuclear weapons states to reaffirm their commitments to negative security assurances, to swiftly negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty, and to uphold the nuclear testing moratorium until the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty can be brought into force. These are all steps consistent with commitments made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference in the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament.

The United States has been the most egregious offender of the 13 Practical Steps. It has failed to even keep faith with any of the promises it made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. As with other treaties signed by his predecessor, President George W. Bush has felt unconstrained in abandoning promises made before his ascendancy to the presidency. Despite its pledges to do otherwise, the United States, under the Bush administration, has undermined not only the 13 Practical Steps, but the whole of the non-proliferation and disarmament regimes by:

- failing to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
- opposing a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty;
- substituting the SORT treaty for the START treaties;
- scrapping the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, opening the door for deployment of missile defenses and placing weapons in outer space;
- keeping nuclear weapons at the center of its security policies;
- funding and conducting research to create new nuclear weapons and developing new capabilities for existing warheads; and
- demonstrating no political will toward the elimination of its nuclear arsenal.

3 Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, United Nations General Assembly Document A/51/218, 15 October 1996, p. 37.

4 Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, United Nations General Assembly Document A/51/218, 15 October 1996, p. 42.

5 Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, United Nations General Assembly Document A/51/218, 15 October 1996, p. 43.

6 The full text of the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Final Document can be found at the website of the Arms Control Association: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_06/docjun.asp.

7 Ibid.

8 *In Larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*, United Nations General Assembly Document A/59/2005, 21 March 2005, p. 28.

In addition to demonstrating its own lack of political will for nuclear disarmament by its failure to meet its obligations under the NPT and numerous other treaties, the United States has also pursued a “do-as-I-say-not-as-I-do-approach” when it comes to other states that may or may not be in full compliance with NPT requirements.

President Bush said recently, “We cannot allow rogue states that violate their commitments and defy the international community to undermine the NPT’s fundamental role in strengthening international security.”⁹

There is an important element of truth to President Bush’s view that “[w]e must therefore close the loopholes that allow states to produce nuclear materials that can be used to build bombs under the cover of civilian nuclear programs.”¹⁰ Not widely known to the public is the fact that Article IV of the NPT promotes nuclear energy for peaceful uses, even referring to it as an “inalienable right.” A major contradiction in the treaty is its goal of preventing nuclear proliferation while promoting nuclear energy. It is clear to all that greater safeguards are needed, particularly safeguards preventing the enrichment of uranium and the separation of plutonium. These are penultimate steps to developing nuclear weapons and they should be prevented by the international community. Again, the only way these safeguards make any sense for the non-nuclear weapons states is if they are equally applied to the nuclear weapons states and in conjunction with moving toward fulfilling their nuclear disarmament obligations. Without applying equal expectations of and standards to both the nuclear weapons states and the non-nuclear weapons states, some non-nuclear weapons states may seek to address the imbalance of power between the nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” by themselves becoming nuclear powers.

Secretary General Annan has also pointed out that “[t]he spread of nuclear technology has exacerbated a long-standing tension within the nuclear regime, arising from the simple fact that technology required for civilian nuclear fuel can also be used to develop nuclear weapons.”¹¹ To deal with this situation, he called for strengthening the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency through universal adoption of the Model Additional Protocol.¹² He also called for providing incentives for states to “voluntarily forego the development of

domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium separation capacities, while guaranteeing their supply of the fuel necessary to develop peaceful uses.”¹³ While clinging to the perceived benefits of nuclear energy, the Secretary General’s proposal for a program that is entirely voluntary and based on incentives is far too little in light of the potential for nuclear proliferation inherent in uranium enrichment and plutonium separation.

Fulfilling Both Sides of the NPT Bargain

The question before the parties to the NPT at the 2005 Review Conference is whether both sides of the NPT bargain will be fulfilled. If not, the treaty and the non-proliferation and disarmament regimes in general face a serious threat of unraveling altogether. As UN Secretary General Kofi Annan wrote in a recent report, “Progress in both disarmament and non-proliferation is essential and neither should be held hostage to the other.”¹⁴ In fact, each is dependent upon the other. Without disarmament, controlling nuclear proliferation is unlikely. Without controlling proliferation, nuclear disarmament is unlikely. There is a symbiotic relationship between the two. The less nuclear weapons in the world and the tighter the international controls on them, the fewer possibilities will exist for proliferation. The more extensive the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the more difficult it will be to successfully eliminate nuclear arsenals.

A recent United Nations report warned: “We are approaching the point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.”¹⁵ This is an outcome that cannot be desirable to any country, and certainly one that would have grave implications for our shared global future. It is an outcome that must be averted by our actions now. The parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty have an opportunity and a responsibility to come together to solve this problem by their commitments and their actions. Mere rhetoric or business as usual will only hasten the demise of the non-proliferation regime and help to bring about the “cascade of proliferation.” A far more serious and urgent response is needed. It is time to return to basics and revive nuclear disarmament actions within the non-proliferation regime. Failing to do so increases the likelihood of future nuclear disasters.

9 Sanger, David E., “News Analysis: Bush seeks to alter global nuclear pact,” *International Herald Tribune*, 16 March 2005.

10 Ibid.

11 *In Larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*, United Nations General Assembly Document A/59/2005, 21 March 2005, p. 28.

12 Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, INFCIRC/540, September 1997.

13 *In Larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*, United Nations General Assembly Document A/59/2005, 21 March 2005, p. 28.

14 *In Larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*, United Nations General Assembly Document A/59/2005, 21 March 2005, p. 28.

15 “A more secure world: our shared responsibility,” *Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, United Nations General Assembly Document, A/59/565, 2 December 2004, p. 39.

The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation believes that a series of unambiguous commitments are needed if the nuclear non-proliferation regime is to survive. The regime has already been pushed to the breaking point by the double standards of the nuclear weapons states and by their failure to make good faith efforts to fulfill their obligations. In light of the deep concerns of the nuclear weapons states about potential nuclear proliferation to other states, as well as the added risks of nuclear weapons becoming available to non-state extremists, the non-nuclear weapons states have an opportunity to put pressure on the nuclear weapons states to make time-bound commitments to nuclear disarmament. We believe that the non-nuclear weapons states should seize this opportunity on behalf of the vast majority of humankind that they represent.

The leaders of the nuclear weapons states must be made to realize that they can no longer live by “do-as-I-say-not-as-I-do” standards and at the same time assure the security of their countries, as well as that of humanity as a whole. Fifty years ago, the signers of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto set forth the choice confronting humanity: “Here, then, is the problem which we present to you, stark and dreadful and inescapable: Shall we put an end to the human race; or shall mankind renounce war?”¹⁶ It is the overwhelming power of nuclear weapons that has made this choice necessary. The choice still confronts us today and endangers our common future. The way forward is by fulfilling the obligation to nuclear disarmament as set forth in Article VI of the NPT.

¹⁶ [Russell-Einstein Manifesto](http://www.nuclearfiles.org/redocuments/1955/550709-russel-einstein.html), issued 9 July 1955, <http://www.nuclearfiles.org/redocuments/1955/550709-russel-einstein.html>. See also Appendix E.

NON-PROLIFERATION: NPT BREAKDOWN?

In order to counter the perceived power of nuclear weapons states, acquiring nuclear weapons has become the goal of some countries and extremist groups. The rapid spread of and increased ability to access information, along with scientific expertise and technical capacity, has also made it easier than ever before to build a nuclear weapon. Furthermore, it has also become easier to obtain fissile material from hundreds of poorly guarded nuclear sites throughout the world. With all of these developments, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the non-proliferation and disarmament regimes in general are under severe threat of unraveling altogether.

Universality

In the past five years, there has been no progress toward making the NPT universal. In fact, there has been regression. The three recognized de facto nuclear weapons states outside the treaty – Israel, India and Pakistan – have shown no inclination to join the treaty as non-nuclear weapons states or to give up their nuclear arsenals. They remain nuclear weapons states outside the boundaries of the treaty.

Israel

Israel has continued to remain silent about its nuclear program and arsenal, only stating officially that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.¹⁷ This ambiguous and enigmatic statement only seems useful for obfuscating the true status of Israel's nuclear arsenal.

India and Pakistan

While India and Pakistan received attention in the past regarding their nuclear programs, they are now largely accepted as part of the “nuclear club” and rarely scrutinized. India and Pakistan faced few consequences for developing nuclear arsenals, and both have been rewarded with arms deals by the United States for their participation in the “war on terror.” They continue to develop and test missile systems, making South Asia one of the most dangerous nuclear flashpoints on the planet.

For its part, India, which overtly tested nuclear weapons in 1998, claims it has not signed the NPT because the treaty seeks to restrict nuclear weapons to a few countries rather than eliminate them completely. The Indian government has said that it would be willing to join global nonproliferation efforts if all nuclear weapon states cut their arsenals, lower the alert status of their strategic weapons, and boost cooperation in nuclear technologies for economic development, especially in the energy sector.¹⁸

North Korea

North Korea has also joined this category of de facto nuclear powers. In 2003, North Korea withdrew from the NPT, and in 2005, announced that it possesses nuclear weapons. Six-party talks between North Korea and China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the United States have made no progress over the past several years. North Korea and US officials blame each other for the deterioration of the talks. Negotiations on North Korea's nuclear program have become a cyclical pattern in which an agreement between the US and North Korea is reached in crisis, but with one country waiting for the other to act before fulfilling their own promises. There remains a deep lack of trust on both sides.

Additionally, North Korean officials remain concerned about US military intentions toward them. These concerns may certainly have been heightened by the US war against Iraq for purportedly possessing weapons of mass destruction. In response to recent joint US-South Korean military exercises that brought the US carrier Kitty Hawk into port in South Korea, the Korean Central News Agency of North Korea stated: “The U.S. loud-mouthed talk about ‘a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue’ and ‘six-party talks’ is nothing but a red herring and its policy to invade the DPRK remains unchanged. The U.S. is talking about ‘dialogue’ while leveling a gun at its dialogue partner after dispatching even the carrier flotilla. This clearly reveals its gangster-like intention to force the DPRK to disarm itself and topple it in the end.”¹⁹ Because North Korea is not capable of matching US military strength, it views its nuclear program as a means of providing deterrence against a US military attack as well as a negotiating card for economic aid.

¹⁷ See, for example, [Shehori, Dalia](http://www.nonviolence.org/vanunu/archive2/feb3knesset.html), “Knesset Explodes in First Nuclear Debate,” Ha'aretz, 3 February 2000, <http://www.nonviolence.org/vanunu/archive2/feb3knesset.html>

¹⁸ Rajesh Mahapatra, “India Accuses World Powers of Slackening of Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime,” Associated Press, 28 March 2005.

¹⁹ “KNCA Flails Entry of Kitty Hawk into S. Korea,” Korean Central News Agency of DPRK via Korea News Service (KNS), 16 March 2005, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/dprk/2005/dprk-050317-kcna06.htm>

Iran

Iran, while claiming not to have a nuclear weapons program, has been enriching uranium and moving closer to the possibility of developing a nuclear arsenal. In doing so, it has drawn the ire of the US and Israel, both of which have made not-so-veiled threats of force in response to an Iranian nuclear weapons program.

In leaks to media in 2004, US intelligence officials charged that a specially secured site on the Parchin complex, 20 miles southeast of Tehran, may be used for research in making high-explosive components for use in nuclear weapons. In September 2004, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors adopted a resolution calling on Iran to cooperate fully with the agency's investigation of its nuclear programs and to "suspend all [uranium] enrichment-related activities." The resolution specified that the suspension should include the "manufacture or import of centrifuge components, the assembly and testing of centrifuges," and the production of uranium hexafluoride – a substance that can be used to produce weapons-grade uranium. The IAEA has continued to press Iran to allow inspectors into the Parchin facility.²⁰

Three European countries – France, Germany and the UK – have engaged in negotiations with Iran for a compromise solution. Thus far, these negotiations have not produced results. Iran continues to reject demands to end its uranium enrichment program and claims that its program is only for the "peaceful" development of nuclear energy. However, in November 2004, Iran agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment program during the negotiations with the three European countries in order to avoid being referred to the UN Security Council for possible sanctions.²¹ Being referred to the Security Council by the IAEA could pave way for possible mili-

tary action against Iran, which although unlikely, is a possibility nonetheless. Although that agreement has not yet been violated, some western diplomats have charged that Iran is still turning tons of raw uranium into uranium metal and has said it would continue to do so, exploiting a loophole in its deal with the Europeans.

Nuclear Black Market

The rapid spread of and increased ability to access information, knowledge and technical capacity have made it easier than ever before for countries and non-state actors to build a nuclear weapon. Furthermore, it has also become easier to obtain fissile material from hundreds of poorly guarded nuclear sites throughout the world. This was evidenced in 2004 by the revelation of the existence of a nuclear black market network. In February 2004, the "father" of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, signed a confession admitting that

"The trend has been toward inaction or late action on the part of the international community, selective invocation of norms and treaties, and unilateral and self-help solutions on the part of individual states or groups of states. Against this background of insecurity and instability, it should not come as a surprise to witness the continued interest in the acquisition of nuclear weapons."

—Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei
Director General, International
Atomic Energy Agency

he provided Iran, North Korea and Libya with the designs and technology to produce the fuel for nuclear weapons during the last 15 years. Khan's confession included admission of trafficking components for building centrifuges needed to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear bombs. The center of the Khan network is suspected to be a trading company run by a Sri Lankan middleman in Dubai, extending to middlemen in Germany, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey and the UK. Despite this revelation of the largest nuclear proliferation scheme ever uncovered, the Pakistani government has protected Khan and his associates involved in the black market. While the Pakistani government has provided useful information to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it has not allowed direct access to A.Q. Khan and his associates involved in the network for interrogation.²² Because of

20 A comprehensive chronology on the Iran Crisis is available on the website of the Arms Control Association at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_12/IranChronology.asp.

21 "Paris Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran and France, Germany and the United Kingdom, with the support of the High Representative of the European Union," November 2004, <http://www.armscontrol.org/country/iran/ParisAgreement.asp>.

22 See, for example, David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Uncovering the Nuclear Black Market: Working Toward Closing Gaps in the International Non-proliferation Regime," Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), 2 July 2004, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/nuclear_black_market.html.

its close partnership with Pakistan in the so-called “War on Terror,” the US has not pursued non-proliferation efforts with Pakistan as vigorously as it has in other cases, including Iran and North Korea.

NATO Nuclear Weapons

More than a decade after the end of the Cold War, the US continues to deploy some 480 nuclear weapons in Europe.²³ The targets for these weapons are most likely in Iran, Russia and Syria. Although 480 is less than the

number of nuclear weapons the US deployed in NATO countries during the Cold War, prior to a February 2005 report by the Natural Resources Defense Council, most observers believed there were no more than half that many still left in Europe. US nuclear weapons currently are located at eight air force bases in six European countries – Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The continuing presence of these weapons undermines relations with Iran and Russia, as well as global efforts to dissuade other nations from developing nuclear weapons.

23 Hans M. Kristensen, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A review of post-Cold War policy, force levels, and war planning,” February 2005, <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/euro/contents.asp>.

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: GOOD FAITH?

The five nuclear weapons states recognized under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States) have long tried to maintain exclusivity in their possession of nuclear weapons, which over time has only enhanced the perception that nuclear weapons are a source of power and prestige. In addition, their continued possession of nuclear weapons demonstrates to the world that even the most economically and militarily powerful nations rely upon nuclear weapons for security. Furthermore, the possession of nuclear weapons provides the nuclear weapons states with a psychological advantage through the tacit threat to use these weapons in a worst case conflict scenario. All of these factors provide incentives for proliferation.

Not only are the nuclear weapons states flouting their lack of commitment to the “unequivocal undertaking” to pursue nuclear disarmament, they are also engaging in programs that undermine the NPT and place all non-proliferation efforts at risk. A brief sketch of these issues is provided below for each of the nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT.

China

Although China maintains a declaratory No First Use policy with regard to nuclear weapons and has sponsored many disarmament resolutions in the UN, it is proceeding with modernizing its nuclear arsenal in addition to increasing its military capabilities. Specifically, China is modernizing its missile force to include an emerging cruise missile capability. Despite promises to do so, China has not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and continues to maintain its nuclear test site. Many analysts attribute China’s nuclear modernization efforts to the US development and deployment of ballistic missile defenses, which undermine China’s minimum deterrence capacity.

France

France is at the stage of preliminary research into “miniaturized” nuclear weapons, but claims that it has not pursued their “development” (perfecting and producing them). To renounce them definitively would imply renouncing the current research. The French military is exploring the possibility of using lasers (LIL and LMJ) for “lighting” thermonuclear fusion that could make it possible to build hydrogen bombs of limited power. When this research is complete, it will then be possible to reopen the “question of use” and to opt for “development.” In regard to further reductions of its nuclear arsenal, the French government claims that it already has a “minimum sufficiency” deterrent with its Triomphant strategic missile submarines and Super Etendard aircraft and has no plans to further reduce its arsenal.

The French government has also committed itself to a nuclear testing simulation program that, according to its own public statements, “seeks to renew France’s nuclear arms deterrent program without actually testing the weapons.”

“We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and postulate plans for their use.”

—Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei
Director General, International
Atomic Energy Agency

Russian Federation

Although Russia agreed under START II to de-MIRV its nuclear missiles, it has now decided to retain its SS-18s and SS-19s ICBMs with multiple warheads until at least 2016. President Vladimir Putin has also announced that Russia intends to begin producing a “hypersonic” missile equipped with Maneuverable Re-Entry Vehicle (MARV) technology in order to counter US ballistic missile defenses. Russia has also increased its nuclear weapons budget. These actions are viewed as a response to US abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and its deployment of ballistic missile defense interceptors.

The 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, which Russia negotiated with the US, fails to follow the com-

mitment to make nuclear disarmament irreversible and verifiable. Russia, along with the US, continues to conduct subcritical underground nuclear weapons tests. Although subcritical tests are not considered full nuclear weapons tests because they never reach a full nuclear reaction, the tests do violate the spirit of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom (UK) continues to work on a nuclear modernization program, including work to ensure its Trident missile force “could remain an effective deterrent for up to 30 years,”²⁴ thereby seeking to assure the “continuing role of nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of the UK’s national security.”²⁵ It has adapted its Trident missile force for tactical nuclear missions, which expands the range of situations in which the UK could use nuclear weapons.

Although the UK has signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), it is spending 2 billion to “upgrade” its Aldermaston nuclear weapons facility, which would make it possible to design, develop and build a replacement for Trident. The upgraded site will include a laser facility to simulate nuclear test explosions.

In 2004, the UK also came under scrutiny for its collaboration with the US in programs that could contribute to the design of new nuclear weapons. The UK government also refused any parliamentary debate during the renewal of their nuclear collaboration through the Mutual Defense Agreement with the US in 2004. Additionally, the UK continues to collaborate with the US on subcritical underground nuclear testing.

United States

As demonstrated by its policies set forth in the National Security Strategy, the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Nuclear Posture Review, and backed by its budget,²⁶ the US has become the most egregious offender of NPT disarmament and non-proliferation obligations. Despite the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons remain central to US security policy. Increasingly aggressive US military policies, combined with a rejection of international law and norms, are negatively impacting relations with other countries around the world, as well as global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.

Despite promising to preserve and strengthen the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the US withdrew from the Treaty in 2002 in order to develop and deploy a missile defense program that is actually offensive in nature since it enhances a US first-strike capability. By the end of 2004, six “interceptors” were emplaced at Ft. Greely, Alaska, and two at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. There have been major technical difficulties in deploying a national missile defense system, and the last two tests of the system have been dramatic failures. As many military and scientific experts have expressed, the program, which has already cost over \$100 billion and will cost at least another \$50 billion over the next five years, will only provide an illusion of security and could lead to new nuclear arms races on Earth and in Outer Space.

Further, the US has refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and is seeking to reduce the amount of time it would take to conduct a full nuclear weapons test. While it still adheres to the nuclear testing moratorium, except for subcritical tests and computer simulations, it has allocated funds to improve testing facilities and reduce the time needed to ready the Nevada Test Site to resume testing. In 2004, Congress authorized \$25 million in order to decrease the preparation time to resume nuclear testing from 36 to 24 months. For 2005, Congress has authorized \$26.8 million for enhanced test site readiness to ensure that the Nevada Test Site could execute an underground nuclear weapons test within 18 months of receiving orders by the President. For 2006, the administration is requesting \$25 million to complete Test Site preparedness. Should the US choose to resume testing, it would open a Pandora’s Box of nuclear development and testing throughout the world.

The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), negotiated with Russia, calls for the reduction of current strategic forces of each country’s arsenal to between 1,700 and 2,200 nuclear warheads by 2012, the year in which the treaty expires. Thousands of warheads will remain in storage ready to be reactivated in days, weeks or months. The treaty does not require the destruction of a single missile launcher or warhead and each side can carry out the reductions at its own pace and even reverse them to temporarily build up its forces. In other words, the treaty allows either side to worry more about protecting their own nuclear options than constraining the options of the other country by achieving verifiable and irreversible reductions in nuclear arms.

24 UK Ministry of Defence, *Delivering Security in a Changing World*: Defence White Paper, Presented to Parliament by The Secretary of State for Defence, December 2003, www.mod.uk/linked_files/publications/whitepaper2003/volume1.pdf.

25 Ibid.

26 See, for example, Dr. Robert Civiak, “America’s One-Nation Arms Race,” Tri-Valley CAREs, April 2005, <http://www.trivalleycares.org>.

The US has ended a decade-long Congressional ban on research and development of nuclear weapons under 5 kilotons (mini-nukes). While funds were cut for this program in the 2005 budget, they were transferred to a program called the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). This is a concept, dating back a couple of decades, to develop a robust, reliable warhead that could be kept in the arsenal with minimal maintenance for many decades to come. In the 2006 budget, the administration is once again seeking funding for the RRW that will focus on adapting an existing warhead. There is concern that the RRW could lead to new missions, expanded production, and a return to full-scale testing. The program also adds to the strong impression that the US intends to maintain its nuclear arsenal indefinitely.

While Congressional funding for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) was zeroed out of the 2005 budget, the Bush administration is again seeking funding for the so-called "bunker buster" in the 2006 budget. Research on the development of such weapons, increases the likelihood of use of nuclear weapons, blurring the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons. The US has also allocated funds to create a new nuclear bomb plant, which would produce up to 450 plutonium pits annually. This is viewed as a further indication that

the US is planning to develop new nuclear weapons and to possess and rely upon nuclear weapons for the indefinite future.

The US continues to rely upon its nuclear arsenal to threaten retaliation against a nuclear attack. In fact, it has extended this threat of nuclear retaliation to chemical and biological weapons attacks or threats of attacks against the US, as well as its troops or allies, wherever they are located in the world. Despite previous promises not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states, the US has developed contingency plans to use nuclear weapons against four or possibly five non-nuclear weapon states: Iraq,²⁷ Iran, North Korea,²⁸ Syria and Libya. Moreover, in 2004, the US issued National Security Directive 17,²⁹ which indicated for the first time in America's history that it would engage in a first use of nuclear weapons – a historic statement.

In sum, the current US approach to nuclear weapons is to rely upon them for extended deterrence, to conduct research on more usable weapons, to indicate that its reliance on these weapons is long-term, to violate and abrogate treaty agreements, to unilaterally reverse previous commitments, and to fail to provide leadership toward significant and irreversible reductions in nuclear arms.

27 The US war against Iraq and its current occupation of the country would presumably now preclude the use of nuclear weapons against that country.

28 In February 2005, North Korea announced it has a nuclear arsenal. The extent of North Korea's nuclear arsenal is unknown, but it is estimated to possess some six to eight nuclear warheads.

29 See, for example, "Senator Feinstein Urges Administration Not to Open Door to New Nuclear Weapon Development," 16 March 2005, <http://feinstein.senate.gov/05releases/r-nuclear0316.htm>

REVIVING NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: EIGHT COMMITMENTS

In the past, the nuclear weapons states have made commitments to nuclear disarmament, which they have failed to keep. Article VI of the treaty contains a commitment to “good faith” negotiations for nuclear disarmament. In 1995, at the time of the NPT Review and Extension Conference, additional commitments were made “to systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.”³⁰ At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the commitments of the nuclear weapons states were set forth in 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament,³¹ steps that the nuclear weapons states, particularly the US, have largely cast aside.

Given the poor track record of the US and other nuclear weapons states in the past on fulfilling their commitments to achieve nuclear disarmament, is it reasonable to expect that new commitments would improve the situation? The

Nuclear Age Peace Foundation believes that it is, but that these commitments must be measured by tangible achievements rather than rhetoric. Our positive view of the potential effectiveness of a new set of commitments by the nuclear weapons states is based upon their realizing that a nuclear weapons-free world is a preferred world for all, and that serious nuclear disarmament is essential to their own security. Without serious steps toward nuclear disarmament, backed by strong political will to achieve this goal, the number of nuclear weapons states is likely to grow and the likelihood of nuclear weapons becoming available to terrorist organizations will increase. In both cases, the result will be increasing insecurity for the nuclear weapons states.

The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation proposes the following eight interlinking commitments that must be made by the nuclear weapons states at the 2005 NPT Review Conference and measured by tangible progress in a timely manner. Some of these commitments have been made in the past and these must be reaffirmed. The

nuclear weapons states must agree clearly and unambiguously to all eight commitments. The nuclear weapons states must realize that they can no longer view nuclear weapons as a source of power and prestige in today’s world when they pose such incredible danger to the very people they portend to protect. While to some countries, moving toward eliminating nuclear arsenals may appear to be a sacrifice, it is undoubtedly a sacrifice that will have tangible security benefits for themselves and for the world.

“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

—Article VI
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons

1. Commitment to Total Nuclear Disarmament and to Good Faith Negotiations

This commitment was already made indirectly under Article VI of the NPT when it entered into force and it was reaffirmed at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences. In 2000, the commitment was to

“an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals....” The nuclear weapons states, however, have viewed the elimination of their nuclear arsenals as an “ultimate” goal, seemingly far in the future.

Article VI of the NPT calls for “good faith” negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament. The International Court of Justice has interpreted Article VI in this way: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” These negotiations should commence immediately between the US and Russia, the two countries that possess some 97 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons. Then, after some measure of progress between the US and Russia, the negotiations should be expanded to include the other nuclear weapons states within the NPT (China, France and the UK) and the nuclear weapons states outside the NPT (Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea).

³⁰ The full text of the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Final Document can be found on the Foundation’s Nuclear Files website at: http://www.nuclearfiles.org/hinonproliferationtreaty/95npt_index.html.

³¹ See Appendix C of this briefing booklet to view the full text of the 13 Practical Steps.

2. Commitment to a Timeframe

A timeframe implies setting deadlines for accomplishing goals and marking progress. The nuclear weapons states have stayed away from timeframes in the past, and this can be interpreted as a demonstration of their unwillingness to actually move forward with the elimination of their nuclear arsenals in a serious way. Committing to a timeframe demonstrates serious commitment that can be tangibly measured. Only a strict timeframe for achieving significant markers on the road to complete nuclear disarmament will provide assurance of the political will by the nuclear weapons states to fulfill their obligations in a timely way.

We believe that the commitment to total nuclear disarmament must be made within a time-bound framework such as the one that is being proposed by the Mayors for Peace Emergency Campaign to Ban Nuclear Weapons. The Mayors for Peace have called for negotiations on a verifiable nuclear weapons ban to begin in 2005 and be completed by 2010, and for the actual elimination of the weapons to take place by 2020.³² This is a feasible timeframe to allow for incremental reductions and the development and implementation of effective international inspection, safeguarding and dismantlement procedures.

3. Commitment to No First Use

There is no feasible justification for a nuclear weapons state to threaten or use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapons state. This should be an inherent understanding in the NPT bargain. If this were not part of the bargain, there would be a clear incentive for non-nuclear weapons states to acquire nuclear weapons. At the time of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension

“Progress in both disarmament and non-proliferation is essential and neither should be held hostage to the other. Recent moves towards disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States should be recognized...However, the unique status of nuclear-weapon States also entails a unique responsibility, and they must do more, including but not limited to further reductions in their arsenals of non-strategic nuclear weapons and pursuing arms control agreements that entail not just dismantlement but irreversibility.”

—Kofi Annan
Secretary General of the United Nations

Conference, the nuclear weapons states offered negative security assurances to the non-nuclear weapons states.³³ These pledges were placed in some doubt when it was revealed in the 2001 US Nuclear Posture Review that the US was drawing up contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons against seven countries, five of which were non-nuclear weapons states.³⁴ All nuclear weapons states must unconditionally pledge policies of No First Use of nuclear weapons against other nuclear weapons states and policies of No Use against non-nuclear weapons states. This commitment will not only provide security assurances to both nuclear and non-nuclear states, it will also open the way to phased, mutual reductions of nuclear arsenals and would be a critical step in achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

4. Commitment to Irreversibility and Verifiability

Irreversibility refers to making all agreements to reduce nuclear stocks permanent. Once nuclear weapons are removed by agreement from deployed status, they should be dismantled and destroyed. Unfortunately, the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) between the US and Russian makes no provisions for irreversibility.³⁵ Thus, the strategic warheads taken off deployed status can be maintained for future use, and redeployed at a future date. This is not true nuclear disarmament and is unacceptable. Irreversibility is called for in the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament. Thus, the commitment has already been made and must be reaffirmed in both words and action.

Verifiability means that all steps in the process of eliminating nuclear weapons, including reductions in nuclear armaments and stores of fissile materials, must be verified. There is a reasonable expectation that all actions taken

32 For more information on the Mayors for Peace Emergency Campaign to Ban Nuclear Weapons, visit: <http://www.abolitionnow.org/mayors.html>.

33 The full text of the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Final Document can be found on the Foundation's Nuclear Files website at: http://www.nuclearfiles.org/hinonproliferationtreaty/95npt_index.html.

34 Excerpts from the classified 2001 US Nuclear Posture Review can be found at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm>.

35 The full text of the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) can be found on the Foundation's Nuclear Files website at: <http://www.nuclearfiles.org/kinuclearweapons/weaponsSOR%20treaty.htm>.

under an agreement to eliminate nuclear arsenals should be verifiable by other concerned states and by the international community. This commitment, included in the 13 Practical Steps, is a matter of self-interest and confidence building.

5. Commitment to Standing Down Nuclear Forces

Nuclear forces on high alert increase the possibility of their inadvertent use. Yet, 15 years after the end of the Cold War, the US and Russia continue to maintain some 4,000 nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, ready to be launched in minutes. Many authorities consider this to be the greatest nuclear danger facing humanity.³⁶ It could be remedied easily by taking these weapons off high alert status and increasing the time needed to fire a nuclear weapon from minutes to at least hours, and preferably days. Commitments to standing down nuclear forces, particularly between the US and Russia but also by all other nuclear weapons states, both within and outside the NPT, should be made as a matter of highest urgency.

6. Commitment to No New Nuclear Weapons

It is not possible to be committed both to the non-proliferation or elimination of nuclear arsenals and to the development of new nuclear weapons or modification of existing ones. If nuclear weapons are to be eliminated, the process must proceed from an assessment of current arsenals and the steps that need to be achieved to go from where we stand to zero. The development of new nuclear weapons reflects a commitment to an improved nuclear arsenal and a reliance on these arsenals for security for the foreseeable future. This basic commitment is also called for in Article VI of the NPT in the clause

requiring the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date.³⁷ This is a foundational commitment that must be made in order to move forward with the other commitments.

7. Commitment to a Verifiable Ban on Fissile Materials

Fissile materials – plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) – are fundamental ingredients for all nuclear weapons. In order to further strengthen the non-proliferation regime, the nuclear weapons states must make a commitment to a global, verifiable ban on the production of fissile materials. A verifiable Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) would ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, effectively putting a limit on the size of nuclear arsenals. The FMCT would also require the opening up of nuclear facilities in all states, including the nuclear weapons states, to international inspection. Fissile materials from dismantled nuclear weapons must also be disposed of under international safeguards. This commitment, included in the 13 Practical Steps, would make reductions in nuclear arsenals more transparent, accountable, verifiable and irreversible.

8. Commitment to Accounting, Transparency and Reporting

Each nuclear weapons state must account for its nuclear arsenal, be transparent with regard to its arsenal, and report on progress made in fulfilling its other commitments to achieve the elimination of its arsenal. These activities are essential to building confidence and to allowing for verification of the disarmament process. These steps will provide the baseline for moving forward with nuclear disarmament and for measuring progress.

³⁶ See, for example, Bruce Blair, "Hair-Trigger Missiles Risk Catastrophic Terrorism," 29 April 2003, <http://www.cdi.org/blair/hair-trigger-dangers.cfm>

³⁷ The full text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons can be found on the Foundation's Nuclear Files website at: <http://www.nuclearfiles.org/redocuments/1968/680701-npt.html>

CLOSING THE LOOPHOLE

There are currently some 440 nuclear reactors in 31 countries. Every nuclear reactor has the potential to manufacture nuclear weapons material. Reprocessed plutonium (a product of the nuclear power process) and highly enriched uranium (fuel for nuclear reactors) make up the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons. There is due concern that any one of the 44 nuclear capable states could turn their “peaceful” nuclear program into a nuclear weapons program. This “loophole” under Article IV of the NPT must be addressed.

The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation proposes the following five interlinking commitments that must be made by all states currently capable of producing highly enriched uranium and plutonium at the 2005 NPT Review Conference in order to close the Article IV “loophole.”

1. Commitment to a Global Ban on Spent Fuel Reprocessing and Reduced Reliance on Nuclear Energy

All states currently capable of producing highly enriched uranium and plutonium should commit to negotiating a global ban on spent fuel reprocessing. In the meantime, all countries with nuclear reactors must commit in the near term to reducing reliance on nuclear power in favor of other forms energy, particularly from renewable sources.

2. Commitment to Bring Uranium Enrichment and Plutonium Separation Facilities Under Strict International Control

Parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and plutonium separation, must immediately be brought under international control for all states. Tough, on-site inspections of nuclear power facilities

must be universally applied to all states, and all fissile materials should be monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

3. Commitment to Regulate and Store Spent Nuclear Fuel Under Strict International Control

In the year 2000, the amount of spent nuclear fuel worldwide was estimated to be some 220,000 tons. According to recent estimates, that number is growing by approximately 10,000 tons each year, posing a long-term proliferation threat. Spent nuclear fuel from nuclear reactors must

also be regulated and stored under strict international control. This commitment would help improve the security of spent nuclear fuel throughout the world, which could be attractive to terrorists seeking to acquire nuclear materials for a “dirty bomb.”³⁸

“1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.”

—Article IV
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons

38 See, for example, Mike Nartker, “Russia Propose Creating International Spent Nuclear Fuel Centers,” Global Security Newswire, 7 November 2003.

4. Commitment to Make the IAEA Additional Protocol Mandatory for All States

The IAEA Additional Protocol also must become mandatory for all states, including the nuclear weapons states, and must be applied equally to all states. The Additional Protocol is currently a voluntary agreement designed to strengthen and expand existing IAEA safeguards for verifying that non-nuclear weapon states that are parties to the NPT use nuclear materials and facilities for peaceful purposes only. The IAEA Additional Protocol currently is not required to be signed by nuclear weapons state parties to the NPT, though they are urged to adopt its measures as a sign of good faith. It is of urgent importance that this voluntary agreement be made both mandatory and universal.

5. Commitment to Highly Restrict the Trade of all Nuclear Materials and Technology

Huge quantities of fissile material routinely pass through civilian nuclear facilities. Plutonium, for example, is regularly transported between Japan and Europe in vast quantities. Given that only 5-8 kilograms of plutonium are needed to manufacture a nuclear weapon, continued transportation heightens the potential for nuclear material falling into the wrong hands. The trade of all nuclear materials and technology must be highly restricted and placed under strict international control.

All the of the above steps would help ensure that non-nuclear weapons states, as well as non-state actors seeking nuclear capabilities, would not develop or otherwise obtain the expertise, facilities and materials to build nuclear weapons.

“The NPT has the twin goals of non-proliferation and disarmament, along with a longer-term goal of general and complete disarmament. It remains the only legally binding document that commits the Nuclear Weapons States to disarmament. In 2000, those States strengthened this commitment further in giving an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. While this part of the Treaty is arguably one cornerstone, along with the non-proliferation Articles, other elements of the Treaty’s utility and relevance should not escape our attention, particularly the safeguarding of all nuclear programmes of those States with nuclear power.”

—Jayantha Dhanapala
Former UN Under-Secretary General
for Disarmament Affairs;
Commissioner, Weapons of Mass
Destruction Commission

CONCLUSIONS

The seventh Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty offers a decisive opportunity to advance international peace and security by strengthening the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. The mission of the delegates to the 2005 NPT Review Conference is critical in re-affirming and building upon existing NPT obligations and engaging all members of the international community in multilateral and universal nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts, so as to make these obligations effective.

Nuclear proliferation can be prevented, but only if the nuclear weapons states fulfill their part of the NPT bargain to achieve nuclear disarmament. We have proposed

eight commitments that the nuclear weapons states must make to demonstrate the necessary political will to achieve nuclear disarmament. In addition to these eight commitments, the nuclear weapons states must take the lead in closing the treaty's Article IV "loophole."

The failure of this Review Conference to make substantial progress on NPT disarmament obligations would be a tragedy of enormous proportions, opening the door to further nuclear proliferation and the undermining of the NPT itself. Concerted action by the delegates of all states parties to the treaty can avert this tragedy and pave the way to a far safer future for humanity.

APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

A multilateral treaty crucial to establishing international law and norms prohibiting underground nuclear tests. The treaty was opened for signature in 1996. It will not enter into force until all 44 states considered capable of creating a nuclear weapon have signed and ratified the treaty.

Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)

A treaty yet to be created that would verifiably ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, effectively putting a limit on the size of nuclear arsenals.

G8 Countries

A Group of Eight (G8) countries that includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, UK and US that meet annually to deal with the major economic and political issues facing their domestic societies and the international community; international trade; and relationships with developing countries.

Horizontal Proliferation

the transfer of nuclear weapons, technology or materials to nuclear or non-nuclear entities.

Means of Delivery

Missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons that are specially designed for such use.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Additional Protocol – Established in 1997, the Additional Protocol is a safeguard agreement designed to strengthen and expand existing IAEA safeguards for verifying that non-nuclear-weapon states-parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) only use nuclear materials and facilities for peaceful purposes. NPT states-parties are not required to adopt the Additional Protocol, although the IAEA is urging all to do so.

Nuclear Weapons-Dependent States

States such as the non-nuclear NATO states, Japan, Republic of Korea and Australia that do not have nuclear arsenals of their own, but are “protected” under the nuclear umbrella of a nuclear weapons state.

Nuclear Weapons States (NWS)

China (1964), France (1960), Russia (1949), United Kingdom (1952), and United States (1945) declared their nuclear weapons programs prior to 1967 and are thereby recognized under the NPT as nuclear weapons states.

Non-NPT Nuclear Weapons States

India (1974), Israel (1967) and Pakistan (1987) possess nuclear weapons and are not parties to the NPT. By withdrawing from the NPT in 2003 and declaring its possession of nuclear weapons, North Korea has also joined this group.

States That Have Renounced Nuclear Weapons

Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Libya, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, and Ukraine were believed to have had active nuclear weapons research programs or nuclear stockpiles at one point. However, these states, renounced – either voluntarily or by coercion – their nuclear weapons activities.

States of Concern

States, including Iran and North Korea, believed to be or accused of attempting to acquire nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.

Vertical Proliferation

The increase in the size of an existing nuclear weapons state’s nuclear arsenal. It may also include the introduction of new weapons and new capabilities to nuclear arsenals and means of delivery, and changes in national security policies that make the use of nuclear weapons more likely.

APPENDIX B

ACRONYMS

ABM – Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
CTBT – Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
FMCT – Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty
IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency
ICJ – International Court of Justice
NAC – New Agenda Coalition
NNWS – Non-Nuclear Weapons State
NPR – Nuclear Posture Review
NWS – Nuclear Weapons States
NPT – Non-Proliferation Treaty
PrepCom – Preparatory Committee
RevCon – Review Conference
SORT – Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
(also called the Moscow Treaty)
START – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
UN – United Nations
UNGA – United Nations General Assembly

APPENDIX C

THIRTEEN PRACTICAL STEPS FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Paragraph 15 of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference to the Non-Proliferation Treaty adopted by consensus the following program of action toward nuclear disarmament.

15. The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament':

1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

2. A moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States Parties are committed under Article VI.

7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon states leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

- Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon states to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.
- Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon states with regard to their nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.
- The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.
- Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.
- A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimise the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.
- The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon states in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon states to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.

11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament', and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

APPENDIX D

NEW AGENDA RESOLUTION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The following resolution on “Accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments,” sponsored by New Agenda Coalition, was introduced to the United Nations General Assembly (GA) and the First Committee of the GA in 2004. The resolution was adopted 151-6-24 in the General Assembly and 135-5-25 in the First Committee. In the First Committee, France, Israel, Latvia, the UK and the US were the only countries with a no-vote. In the General Assembly, France, Israel, Latvia, Palau, the UK and the US were the only countries with a no-vote.

The General Assembly

Fifty-ninth Session

First Committee

Agenda item 65 (t)

General and complete disarmament: towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: a new agenda

Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden:
Draft Resolution

Accelerating the Implementation of Nuclear Disarmament Commitments

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 58/51 of 8 December 2003, and mindful of the upcoming 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Expressing its grave concern at the danger to humanity posed by the possibility that nuclear weapons could be used and at the lack of implementation of binding obligations and agreed steps towards nuclear disarmament, and reaffirming that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes requiring urgent irreversible progress on both fronts,

Recalling the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament, in accordance with commitments made under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,ⁱ and noting that the ultimate objective of the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

1. *Calls upon* all States to fully comply with commitments made regarding nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-pro-

liferation and not to act in any way that may be detrimental to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation or that may lead to a new nuclear arms race;

2. *Also calls upon* all States to spare no efforts to achieve universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons¹ and the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;

3. *Calls upon* all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accelerate the implementation of the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament that were agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;ⁱⁱ

4. *Calls upon* the nuclear-weapon States to take further steps to reduce their non-strategic nuclear arsenals and not to develop new types of nuclear weapons, in accordance with their commitment to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies;

5. *Agrees* urgently to strengthen efforts towards both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation through the resumption in the Conference on Disarmament of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the special coordinator in 1995ⁱⁱⁱ and the mandate contained therein, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives, as well as the completion and implementation of arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place fissile material no longer required for military purposes under international verification;

6. *Calls for* the establishment of an appropriate subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament;

7. *Underlines* the imperative of the principles of irreversibility and transparency for all nuclear disarmament measures and the need to develop further adequate and efficient verification capabilities;

8. *Decides to* include in the provisional agenda of its sixtieth session the item entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”, and to review the implementation of the present resolution at that session.

ⁱ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 729, No. 10485.

ⁱⁱ See 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, vol. I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and III)), part I.

ⁱⁱⁱ See CD/1299.

APPENDIX E

SEVEN STEPS TO RAISE WORLD SECURITY

by *Mohamed ElBaradei*¹

Four months from now, in New York, the world will have a rare opportunity to make significant improvements in international security. The question is whether we will be smart enough to use it.

In recent years, three phenomena have radically altered the security landscape. They are the emergence of a nuclear black market, the determined efforts by more countries to acquire technology to produce the fissile material useable in nuclear weapons and the clear desire of terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

We have been trying to solve these new problems with existing tools. But for every step forward, we have exposed vulnerabilities in the system. The system itself – the regime that implements the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) – needs reinforcement. Some of the necessary remedies can be taken in May, but only if governments are ready to act.

The opportunity in New York will come in the form of a conference. If that sounds like yet more bureaucracy – addressing nightmarish nuclear security scenarios with more meetings – I sympathise. But this is no ordinary conference. Every five years, the NPT Review Conference brings world leaders together to focus on combating the threat of nuclear weapons. All but four countries will participate as treaty members. Given the global nature of the threats, these four – India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea – should also be encouraged to contribute their insights and concerns.

With seven straightforward steps, and without amending the treaty, this conference could reach a milestone in strengthening world security. The first step: put a five-year hold on additional facilities for uranium enrichment and plutonium separation. There is no compelling reason to build more of these facilities; the nuclear industry has more than enough capacity to fuel its power plants and research centres. To make this holding period acceptable for everyone, commit the countries that already have the facilities to guarantee an economic supply of nuclear fuel for bona fide uses. Then use the hiatus to develop better long-term options for managing the technologies (for example, in regional centres under multinational control). To advance these ideas, I have engaged a group of international nuclear experts, and their proposals will be put forward at the conference.

Second, speed up existing efforts, led by the US global

threat reduction initiative and others, to modify the research reactors worldwide operating with highly enriched uranium – particularly those with metal fuel that could be readily employed as bomb material. Convert these reactors to use low-enriched uranium, and accelerate research on how to make highly enriched uranium unnecessary for all peaceful nuclear applications.

Third, raise the bar for inspection standards by establishing the “additional protocol” as the norm for verifying compliance with the NPT. Without the expanded authority of this protocol, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s rights of inspection are limited. It has proven its value recently in Iran and Libya and should be brought into force for all countries.

Fourth, call on the United Nations Security Council to act swiftly and decisively in the case of any country that withdraws from the NPT, in terms of the threat the withdrawal poses to international peace and security.

Fifth, urge states to act on the Security Council’s recent resolution 1540, to pursue and prosecute any illicit trading in nuclear material and technology.

Sixth, call on the five nuclear weapon states party to the NPT to accelerate implementation of their “unequivocal commitment” to nuclear disarmament, building on efforts such as the 2002 Moscow treaty between Russia and the US. Negotiating a treaty to ban irreversibly the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons programmes would be a welcome start.

Last, acknowledge the volatility of longstanding tensions that give rise to proliferation, in regions such as the Middle East and the Korean peninsula, and take action to resolve existing security problems and, where needed, provide security assurances. In the Middle East, urge all parties to pursue a dialogue on regional security as part of the peace process. One goal of this dialogue would be to make the Middle East a nuclear-weapons-free zone.

None of these steps will work in isolation. Each requires a concession from someone. But with leadership from all sides, this package of proposals will create gains for everyone. This opportunity will come again – in 2010. But given current trends, we cannot afford to wait another five years. As a UN panel put it recently: “We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.” The stakes are too high to risk inaction.

¹ Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei is the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency. He writes here in a personal capacity. Originally published by the *Financial Times*, 2 February 2005.

APPENDIX F

THE RUSSELL-EINSTEIN MANIFESTO

Issued in London, 9 July 1955

In the tragic situation which confronts humanity, we feel that scientists should assemble in conference to appraise the perils that have arisen as a result of the development of weapons of mass destruction, and to discuss a resolution in the spirit of the appended draft.

We are speaking on this occasion, not as members of this or that nation, continent, or creed, but as human beings, members of the species Man, whose continued existence is in doubt. The world is full of conflicts; and, overshadowing all minor conflicts, the titanic struggle between Communism and anti-Communism.

Almost everybody who is politically conscious has strong feelings about one or more of these issues; but we want you, if you can, to set aside such feelings and consider yourselves only as members of a biological species which has had a remarkable history, and whose disappearance none of us can desire.

We shall try to say no single word which should appeal to one group rather than to another. All, equally, are in peril, and, if the peril is understood, there is hope that they may collectively avert it.

We have to learn to think in a new way. We have to learn to ask ourselves, not what steps can be taken to give military victory to whatever group we prefer, for there no longer are such steps; the question we have to ask ourselves is: what steps can be taken to prevent a military contest of which the issue must be disastrous to all parties?

The general public, and even many men in positions of authority, have not realized what would be involved in a war with nuclear bombs. The general public still thinks in terms of the obliteration of cities. It is understood that the new bombs are more powerful than the old, and that, while one A-bomb could obliterate Hiroshima, one H-bomb could obliterate the largest cities, such as London, New York, and Moscow.

No doubt in an H-bomb war great cities would be obliterated. But this is one of the minor disasters that would have to be faced. If everybody in London, New York, and Moscow were exterminated, the world might, in the course of a few centuries, recover from the blow. But we now know, especially since the Bikini test, that nuclear bombs can gradually spread destruction over a very much wider area than had been supposed.

It is stated on very good authority that a bomb can now be manufactured which will be 2,500 times as powerful as that which destroyed Hiroshima. Such a bomb, if exploded near the ground or under water, sends radio-active particles into the upper air. They sink gradually and reach the surface of the earth in the form of a deadly dust or rain. It was this dust which infected the Japanese fishermen and their catch of fish.

No one knows how widely such lethal radio-active particles might be diffused, but the best authorities are unanimous in saying that a war with H-bombs might possibly put an end to the human race. It is feared that if many H-bombs are used there will be universal death, sudden only for a minority, but for the majority a slow torture of disease and disintegration.

Many warnings have been uttered by eminent men of science and by authorities in military strategy. None of them will say that the worst results are certain. What they do say is that these results are possible, and no one can be sure that they will not be realized. We have not yet found that the views of experts on this question depend in any degree upon their politics or prejudices. They depend only, so far as our researches have revealed, upon the extent of the particular expert's knowledge. We have found that the men who know most are the most gloomy.

Here, then, is the problem which we present to you, stark and dreadful and inescapable: Shall we put an end to the human race; or shall mankind renounce war? People will not face this alternative because it is so difficult to abolish war.

The abolition of war will demand distasteful limitations of national sovereignty. But what perhaps impedes understanding of the situation more than anything else is that the term "mankind" feels vague and abstract. People scarcely realize in imagination that the danger is to themselves and their children and their grandchildren, and not only to a dimly apprehended humanity. They can scarcely bring themselves to grasp that they, individually, and those whom they love are in imminent danger of perishing agonizingly. And so they hope that perhaps war may be allowed to continue provided modern weapons are prohibited.

This hope is illusory. Whatever agreements not to use H-bombs had been reached in time of peace, they would no longer be considered binding in time of war, and both sides would set to work to manufacture H-bombs as soon as war broke out, for, if one side manufactured the bombs and the other did not, the side that manufactured them would inevitably be victorious.

Although an agreement to renounce nuclear weapons as part of a general reduction of armaments would not afford an ultimate solution, it would serve certain important purposes. First: any agreement between East and West is to the good in so far as it tends to diminish tension. Second: the abolition of thermo-nuclear weapons, if each side believed that the other had carried it out sincerely, would lessen the fear of a sudden attack in the style of Pearl Harbour, which at present keeps both sides in a state of nervous apprehension. We should, therefore, welcome such an agreement though only as a first step.

Most of us are not neutral in feeling, but, as human beings, we have to remember that, if the issues between East and West are to be decided in any manner that can give any possible satisfaction to anybody, whether Communist or anti-Communist, whether Asian or European or American, whether White or Black, then these issues must not be decided by war. We should wish this to be understood, both in the East and in the West.

There lies before us, if we choose, continual progress in happiness, knowledge, and wisdom. Shall we, instead, choose death, because we cannot forget our quarrels? We appeal, as human beings, to human beings: Remember your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death.


Resolution

We invite this Congress, and through it the scientists of the world and the general public, to subscribe to the following resolution:

“In view of the fact that in any future world war nuclear weapons will certainly be employed, and that such weapons threaten the continued existence of mankind, we urge the Governments of the world to realize, and to acknowledge publicly, that their purpose cannot be furthered by a world war, and we urge them, consequently, to find peaceful means for the settlement of all matters of dispute between them.”

Max Born, Perry W. Bridgman, Albert Einstein, Leopold Infeld, Frédéric Joliot-Curie, Herman J. Muller, Linus Pauling, Cecil F. Powell, Joseph Rotblat, Bertrand Russell, Hideki Yukawa

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FOUNDATION PROGRAMS

Since 1982, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation has worked to enhance both global and human security and is a voice for millions of people concerned about the fate of the planet. The Foundation works in several key programmatic areas to achieve these goals. The following is a brief summary.

Enhancing Security by Reducing Nuclear

Dangers: Since its inception, the cornerstone of the Foundation's work has been to enhance security by working to reduce and eliminate nuclear threats. The Foundation has provided leadership in the establishment of coalitions, including the Middle Powers Initiative, a coalition of eight international organizations working with governments and civil society toward a treaty banning nuclear weapons; and Abolition 2000, a Global Network for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. We helped found and continue to provide leadership to the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (INES). We also developed and launched an Appeal to Eliminate the Nuclear Weapons Threat to Humanity. More than 100 world leaders, including 38 Nobel Laureates, have signed and endorsed the Appeal.

Strengthening International Law: Respect for the rule of law is fundamental to the success of democratic systems throughout the world. Treaties among nations can only exist in a world that respects international law and provides sufficient authority to international bodies to monitor and enforce those agreements. The Foundation participates each year in conferences at the United Nations seeking progress on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In 2002, the Foundation established an annual symposium on critical issues of international law. Topics have included establishing an effective international criminal court; developing a United Nations Emergency Peace

Service capable of responding to acts of genocide and gross human rights violations; and charting a new course for US nuclear policy within a multilateral framework.

Educating and Empowering Youth: The Foundation's Youth Outreach Initiative is on the cutting edge of programs to inspire and empower a new generation of peace leaders. It is one of the few nationally sustained peace programs involving high school and college students. The Initiative includes Peace Leadership Trainings, educational curricula, the Swackhamer Peace Essay Contest, internships, forums and public advocacy campaigns. Thousands of students have participated in these activities and many have gone on to become leaders on their campuses, in their communities and in organizations around the world.

Providing Quality Independent Research and Information: An informed citizenry is necessary to elect responsible decision-makers. In turn, informed decision-makers are necessary to create effective changes in policy. The Foundation is a leader in public education and provides independent analysis to decision-makers around the world. Our public education is conducted primarily through our websites, which attract more than two million visitors each year. Other means to disseminate information include *The Sunflower*, a free e-newsletter sent to some 10,000 subscribers worldwide; reports and briefing books; books, and lectures.

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